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RETHINKING SUBSIDIARITY AND THE BALANCE 
OF POWERS IN THE EU IN LIGHT OF THE LISBON 
TREATY AND BEYOND
Simona Constantin*
Summary: The principle of subsidiarity is meant to demarcate the ex-
ercise of competences between the EU and its Member States and to 
balance the claim for regulatory power which these two legal worlds 
make. This article takes the view that subsidiarity has not proven 
so far to be a very useful touchstone in this regard. Moreover, there 
are still shortcomings in its envisaged application based on the legal 
framework provided by the Lisbon Treaty. It is therefore suggested 
that an approach beyond subsidiarity should be taken in future re-
search in order to shed more light on how powers are balanced in 
practice in the EU.  This approach submits for exploration the follow-
ing hypothesis:  the competences between the EU and its Member 
States are demarcated in daily practice by negotiating and balancing 
national discretionary powers, rather than defi ned through the legal 
framework and application of subsidiarity. In this view, two paths of 
research are proposed. The fi rst identifi es the Council, more specifi -
cally its de facto decision-making body, the Committee of Permanent 
Representatives (Coreper), as an arena for using Member States  na-
tional discretionary powers in the process of negotiating legislation at 
the ex ante EU law-making level. The second view suggests an analy-
sis of how the powers are balanced at the ex post law-making level by 
the European Court of Justice (ECJ) when assessing the principle of 
proportionality and thereof the margin of discretion left to the Member 
States in protecting their national powers and interests. These two 
specifi c perspectives are to be placed in the broader perspective of 
achieving national interests while still contributing to the unity of EU 
law-making.
1. Introduction
The traditional understanding of the legal interplay between the EU 
and its Member States is substantiated in terms of attributing and divid-
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ing competences. Attribution and subsidiarity therefore play an instru-
mental role in this regard. The principle of subsidiarity was included as a 
guiding principle of the European Union (EU) in the Treaty of Maastricht. 
Since then, increasing attention has been given to subsidiarity, both in 
formal aspects - treaty amendments shaping its legal framework, and 
informal practices - interinstitutional agreements and culture developed 
by the EU institutions. As read in Article 5 of the Treaty establishing the 
European Community (EC Treaty), the role attributed to subsidiarity is 
to regulate the exercise of competences between the EU and the Member 
States and to balance the claim for regulatory powers which these two 
legal worlds make. Over time, the meaning of subsidiarity has triggered 
many analyses.1 The main stance taken in legal literature underlines that 
it is hard to clearly operationalise and scrutinise subsidiarity. Due to its 
narrow legal dimension, the decision on who should do what in the EU is 
ultimately left to the political arena. Moreover, although when it became 
part of the Union’s framework subsidiarity was perceived as a protection 
against the overwhelming EU legislation, since Maastricht the integration 
process has entered into new areas of policy, with more aspects being 
regulated at EU level or touched upon by EU legislation.2 It is in this con-
text that it appears relevant to ask whether the principle of subsidiarity 
is well suited and suffi cient for the protection of national powers, and 
whether it provides understanding on how the powers are balanced in 
practice between these two legal worlds: the EU and its Member States. 
Several aspects complicate this understanding and they can be broadly 
encapsulated in three lines of vision. Firstly, there is the limited and 
vague phrasing of the legal framework of subsidiarity. Secondly, there 
are the two common perspectives attached to it: legal and political. And 
thirdly, there are the two rationales underlying its function: according to 
one, subsidiarity functions as a shield against EU powers, while accord-
ing to the other it functions as a dynamic principle, a double-edged sword 
which the two legal worlds can use when it seems to fi t the political bill. 
1  Legal literature abounds in discussions on subsidiarity. For references, see the subsid-
iarity library of the Committee of the Regions at <http://cor.europa.eu/subsidinet/en/sub-
library.htm> accessed 30 March 2008 and the literature referred to in this article. 
2  Under the fi rst pillar, the Community’s pillar, the development of the internal market 
has touched upon areas of policy which fall under the competence of the Member States, 
the EU having only coordinating competence (eg health, industry; culture, tourism, educa-
tion, vocational training; youth and sport). In this line, the current Review of the Internal 
Market Package of the European Commission takes a new perspective, where the internal 
market ‘goes hand-in-hand with social and environment policies to contribute to sustain-
able development goals.’ See Commission (EC), ‘A single market for 21st century Europe’ 
(Communication) COM (2007) 725, 20 November 2007 
<http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:52007DC0724:EN:
NOT> accessed 30 March 2008. The developments under the second and third pillars have 
also contributed to the expansion of the EU integration process.
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Although these visions on subsidiarity up to now position the principle as 
a tool to demarcate between European and national competences, they 
are rather theoretical and create a top-down approach in understanding 
how competences are employed in the EU law-making process. Based on 
a detailed overview of the principle of subsidiarity in retrospect and in 
light of the Lisbon Treaty, this article takes the view that no matter which 
of these visions is upheld, subsidiarity is not a very useful touchstone for 
assessing the actual exercise of powers in the EU. Rather, the article pro-
poses a bottom-up perspective for future research on the subject, which 
could focus more on the process taking place beyond the legal framework 
of subsidiarity. The following hypothesis will therefore be put forward: 
the competences between the EU and the Member States are demarcat-
ed in daily practice by negotiating and balancing national discretionary 
powers, rather than defi ned through the legal framework and application 
of subsidiarity. In this view, three perspectives will be proposed for explo-
ration. The fi rst identifi es the Council, more specifi cally its de facto deci-
sion-making body, the Committee of Permanent Representatives (Core-
per), as an arena for using Member States’ national discretionary powers 
in the process of negotiating legislation at the ex ante EU law-making lev-
el. The second one proposes an analysis of how the powers are balanced 
at the ex post law-making level by the European Court of Justice (ECJ) 
when assessing the principle of proportionality and thereof the margin of 
discretion left to the Member States in protecting their national powers 
and interests. These two specifi c perspectives are to be underlined by a 
third perspective which will employ the concepts of discretion, interests 
and unity. More specifi cally, future research would aim to analyse the 
ways in which Member States can protect national interests through the 
use of discretionary powers in daily practice in the framework of EU law-
making unity.
It is not the ambit of this article to engage in an extensive analysis of 
the principle of subsidiarity. Nevertheless, in the present context, when 
subsidiarity seems to be upgraded in the public debate and in the legal 
construction of the EU, a detailed overview is needed in order to explain 
why this article ultimately proposes an approach beyond subsidiarity. 
This overview will present how the principle has been legally construed 
and applied so far, and will assess whether it can strike the right balance 
between the EU and its Member States. The focus will be to show that 
the existence of subsidiarity up to now in the life of the EU, as well as the 
envisaged application of the new legal framework provided by the Lisbon 
Treaty, does not offer a suffi ciently clear picture of the way in which the 
powers between the EU and the Member States are balanced in practice. 
In this context, it will be pertinent to propose that an approach beyond 
subsidiarity could be taken in future research. This analysis will unfold 
in three further parts of this paper. Part 2 presents an overview of sub-
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sidiarity, starting with a retrospective, delving into the relevant novelties 
contained in the Lisbon Treaty, and ending with concluding remarks. 
The bottom-up perspective that goes beyond subsidiarity and which is 
proposed for future research will be put forward in part 3, followed by 
conclusions in part 4.
2. On subsidiarity 
2.1 Subsidiarity in retrospect
2.1.1 Legal framework
The legal framework of the principle of subsidiarity has been gradu-
ally construed within the treaties.  There was no mention of the principle 
in the initial treaties.3 Only with the adoption of the Single European Act 
was subsidiarity mentioned in a treaty text, although it targeted one fi eld 
only – environment protection.4 The explicit introduction of subsidiarity 
as a general principle of the EU took place with the Treaty of Maastricht. 
Referred to even in the preamble,5 the principle was stated in Article B6 
and defi ned in Article 3b (now Article 5) of the Treaty establishing the 
European Community (EC Treaty).7 A Protocol on the Application of the 
Principles of Subsidiarity and Proportionality was attached to the Treaty 
3  Nevertheless, it can be said that some germs of the principle already existed, as Article 5 
of the Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC Treaty) provided 
that the Community will ‘assure the establishment, the maintenance and the observance of 
normal conditions of competition and take direct action with respect to production and the 
operation of the market only when circumstances make it absolutely necessary’ (emphasis 
added). Later on, Article 235 (now Article 308 EC) of the Treaty establishing the European 
Economic Community (EEC Treaty) contained a rather implicit reference to subsidiarity 
providing that: ‘If any action by the Community appears necessary to achieve, in the func-
tioning of the Common Market, one of the aims of the Community in cases where this 
Treaty has not provided for the requisite powers of action, the Council, acting by means of 
a unanimous vote on a proposal of the Commission and after the Assembly has been con-
sulted, shall enact the appropriate provisions’ (emphasis added).
4  Article 130-R (4) provided that ‘the Community shall take action relating to the environ-
ment to the extent to which the objectives referred to in paragraph 1 can be attained better 
at Community level than at the level of the individual member states.’
5  ‘RESOLVED to continue the process of creating an ever closer union among the peoples 
of Europe, in which decisions are taken as closely as possible to the citizen in accordance 
with the principle of subsidiarity.’ 
6  The last paragraph of this article states: ‘The objectives of the Union shall be achieved 
as provided in this Treaty and in accordance with the conditions and the timetable set out 
therein while respecting the principle of subsidiarity as defi ned in Article 3b of the Treaty 
establishing the European Community.’  
7  This article provides: ‘In areas which do not fall within its exclusive competence, the 
Community shall take action, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, only if and 
in so far as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be suffi ciently achieved by the 
Member States and can therefore, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, 
be better achieved by the Community.’ 
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of Amsterdam. This protocol was based on the conclusions of the Euro-
pean Council of Birmingham from 16 October 1992 and the European 
Council of Edinburgh from 11-12 December 1992,8 and on the Inter-In-
stitutional Agreement of 25 October 1993 between the Parliament, the 
Council and the Commission on the procedures for implementing the 
principle of subsidiarity.9 The protocol requires the institutions to take 
account of the principle of subsidiarity when exercising their powers, and 
provides several procedural requirements, targeting especially the Com-
mission.10 It also provides guidelines for assessing when a Community 
action is justifi ed11 and incorporates the position taken in the conclu-
sions of the Edinburgh European Council, namely that subsidiarity is a 
dynamic concept12 (emphasis added). Finally, the Constitutional Treaty 
meant to reform the legal framework and to increase the scrutiny for EU 
legislation compliance with subsidiarity. The main novelty thereof was 
the introduction of a new actor: the national parliaments. As these provi-
sions have been carried on in the present Lisbon Treaty, we will delve into 
their analysis in section 2.2 of this article. 
It can be observed that the legal framework of subsidiarity devel-
oped along with the increase through various treaty amendments of the 
competences regulated at EU level.13 The more competences were trans-
ferred to the Union, the more developed became the legal framework of 
the principle of subsidiarity. Despite this, as will be further discussed, 
the present and the future legal frameworks of subsidiarity in the Lisbon 
8  See Annex 1 to Part A of the Presidency Conclusions: Bull EC 12-1992, 13.
9  Bull EC 10-1993, 128.
10  According to Article 9 of the Protocol, in exercising its right of initiative, the Commis-
sion should hold mandatory hearings, provide explanatory memorandums, take account of 
fi nancial and administrative burdens, and present annual reports to the other institutions, 
respectively, the Council and the European Parliament, and to the European Council, as 
well as to the Committee of Regions and the Economic and Social Committee.
11  Article 5 of the Protocol provides the following guidelines: ‘- the issue under considera-
tion has transnational aspects which cannot be satisfactorily regulated by action by Mem-
ber States;  - actions by Member States alone or lack of Community action would confl ict 
with the requirements of the Treaty (such as the need to correct distortion of competition 
or avoid disguised restrictions on trade or strengthen economic and social cohesion) or 
would otherwise signifi cantly damage Member States’ interests;  - action at Community 
level would produce clear benefi ts by reason of its scale or effects compared with action at 
the level of the Member States.’
12   Article 3 of the protocol provides: ‘Subsidiarity is a dynamic concept and should be ap-
plied in the light of the objectives set out in the Treaty. It allows Community action within 
the limits of its powers to be expanded where circumstances so require, and conversely, to 
be restricted or discontinued where it is no longer justifi ed.’  
13  Several elements have been identifi ed as having created the context for the rise of sub-
sidiarity; broadly, they relate to the constitutional development of the EU due to the ECJ’s 
bold approach in this sense and to the widening of Community’s powers. See GA Bermann, 
‘Taking Subsidiarity Seriously: Federalism in the European Community and the United 
States’ [1994] Columbia L Rev 348-66.
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Treaty contain shortcomings and do not shed light on how the powers are 
balanced in practice between the EU and its Member States. 
2.1.2 Interpretation in literature 
Since Maastricht, the meaning of subsidiarity has attracted a lot of 
academic attention.14 The relevant literature is abundant in considera-
tions, and the principle has been analysed within various policy areas.15 
Three main lines of vision can be identifi ed in legal literature. The fi rst 
highlights the limited and vague phrasing of the legal framework of sub-
sidiarity. The tensioned political spirits surrounding the adoption of the 
Maastricht Treaty was seen as an explanation of the defi ciencies and am-
biguity of the defi nition of subsidiarity.16 The principle is stated in Article 
5, para (2) EC which fl anks subsidiarity with the principle of attribution 
– para (1) and the principle of proportionality – para (3).17 In the word-
ing of this article, attribution generally limits Community action to the 
competences which have been transferred from the Member States, and 
subsidiarity concerns the exercise of action in the area of shared com-
petences, while proportionality applies to overall Community actions. All 
three principles play a role in delimiting the space for action between 
the Community and the Member States. As read in this defi nition, sub-
sidiarity was intended to control the exercise of the regulatory powers in 
those policy areas where the Union had no exclusive competence, and its 
in-depth signifi cance relates to the fact that decisions should be taken as 
14  On its origins and interpretation in a broader sense, see V Constantinesco, ‘La Sub-
sidiarité comme Principe Constitutionnel de l’Intégration Européenne’ (1991) 46 Aussen-
wirtschaft 439-59; G de Burca, ‘Re-appraising Subsidiarity’s Signifi cance after Amsterdam’ 
(1999) Harvard Jean Monnet Working Paper, No. 7/1999 <http://www.jeanmonnetpro-
gram.org/papers/99/990701.html> accessed 30 March 2008; NW Barber, ‘The Limited 
Modesty of Subsidiarity’ (2005) 11 ELR 308–25; J Peterson, ‘Subsidiarity: A defi nition to 
Suit Any Vision?’ (1994) 47 Parliamentary Affaires 116-32; A Føllesdal, ‘Subsidiarity’ (1998) 
6 Journal of Political Philosophy 190-218; Y Soudan, ‘Subsidiarity and Community in Eu-
rope’ (1998) 5 Ethical Perspectives 177-87; N Emiliou, ‘Subsidiarity: An Effective Barrier 
Against the Enterprises of Ambition’ (1992) 17 EL Rev 383-407.
15  On specifi c policy area analysis, see the literature cited in G de Burca, ‘Proportionality 
and Subsidiarity as General Principles of Law’ in U Bernitz and J Nergelius (eds), The Gen-
eral Principles of EC Law (Kluwer Law International, The Hague 2000) n 23.   
16  See discussion in A Estella, The EU Principle of Subsidiarity and its Critique (OUP, Oxford 
2002) 82-89.
17  Article 5 EC: ‘The Community shall act within the limits of the powers conferred upon it 
by this Treaty and of the objectives assigned to it therein. In areas which do not fall within 
its exclusive competence, the Community shall take action, in accordance with the princi-
ple of subsidiarity, only if and in so far as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be 
suffi ciently achieved by the Member States and can therefore, by reason of the scale or ef-
fects of the proposed action, be better achieved by the Community. Any action by the Com-
munity shall not go beyond what is necessary to achieve the objectives of this Treaty.’ 
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close as possible to the citizens.18  The fact that the EC and EU Treaties 
do not include a precise demarcation of the shared competences blurs 
the margins of application of the principle of subsidiarity, as both the EU 
and the Member States claim regulatory powers.19  It can be said that the 
way in which some of the Treaty provisions are phrased limits the regula-
tory powers of the Member States, as they predetermine an EU action.20 
From its defi nition, it is understood that the objectives of the envisaged 
measure play an important role. For several of these objectives, Commu-
nity actions are already envisaged, while, for others, arguments could be 
made for both Community and Member State action.21 In practice, it is 
diffi cult to make such assessments. The guidelines included in the Am-
sterdam Protocol shed limited light in this respect.22 However, it is true 
that a priori clear and strict criteria for implementing subsidiarity would 
be hard to defi ne. This is due on one hand to the interdependencies be-
tween EU policies which form a basis for motivating the necessity of a 
particular Community intervention,23 and on the other hand to the fact 
that decisions are based on analyses of specifi c resource contexts, which 
might change over time. Thus, as already acknowledged in the literature, 
the application of subsidiarity is to be considered rather on a case-by-
case basis.24 
The second line of vision in the literature refers to the fact that most 
common approaches to subsidiarity study the principle from a legal and 
political perspective; although its mainly political character is highlight-
ed, there is no common view on how much of a legal principle it is.25 
After its entering into force, subsidiarity was perceived in the literature 
18  This is stated in Article 1 of the Treaty on the European Union (EU Treaty): ‘This Treaty 
marks a new stage in the process of creating an ever closer union among the peoples of 
Europe, in which decisions are taken as openly as possible and as closely as possible to 
the citizen.’
19  On the vertical order of competences of the EU, an in-depth analysis is presented in A 
von Bogdandy, J Bast, ‘The European Union’s Vertical Order of Competences: the Current 
Law and Proposals for its Reform’ (2002) 39 CML Rev 227-68.
20  This, for example, is the case with Articles 95 and 308 EC which have been extensively 
used and interpreted in the past, especially as regards the establishment and functioning 
of the internal market. See, for example, S Crosby, ‘The New Tobacco Control Directive: An 
Illiberal and Illegal Disdain for the Law’ (2002) 27 EL Rev 177-93 and R Schuetze, ‘Dynamic 
Integration – Article 308 EC and Legislation ‘in the Course of the Operation of the Common 
Market’: A review Essay’, (2003) 23 Oxford J Legal Stud 333-44.
21  See examples in Estella (n 16) 106-14.
22  See n 11. 
23  This is the case of the internal market which, being placed at the core of EU policies, has 
touched upon other areas which fall in the powers of the Member States. See n 2.
24  See de Burca (n 14) 25. 
25  This relates in great measure to the limits of judicial review applied by the ECJ when as-
sessing subsidiarity. These aspects will be presented in sub-section 2.1.4 of this article.
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as being rather more a rule of institutional conduct and less a principle 
of EC law.26 De Burca has nevertheless described subsidiarity as being 
both a political and legal principle, and thus a general principle of EC 
law, although it is very much politically driven.27 Thus, it has been main-
tained that over the years, subsidiarity has become a ‘fully-fl edged legal 
principle’,28 which the Court has analysed within its case law. However, 
the Working Group which dealt with this principle in the framework of 
drafting the Constitutional Treaty reaffi rmed the ‘essentially political na-
ture’ of subsidiarity.29 It was even said that based on its legal dimension, 
subsidiarity ‘will not, except at the margin, solve questions of competence 
but will structure them.’30 Similarly, it has been maintained that subsidi-
arity is a concept ‘moulded to suit virtually any political agenda’31 and 
that it functions as a ‘paradigm’ for political debate.32 The diffi culties in 
concretely applying subsidiarity reside therefore in the fact it has a nar-
row legal dimension and the decision of the appropriate level of exercising 
a certain competence is fi nally left to the political arena.
The third line of vision in the literature projects two rationales as 
regards the function of subsidiarity. According to one interpretation, sub-
sidiarity acts as a shield against EU powers.33 This view is connected to 
26  See T Schilling, ‘A New Dimension of Subsidiarity: Subsidiarity as a Rule and a Principle’ 
(1994) 14 YEL 203-55, distinguishing between subsidiarity in the narrow sense of a legal 
rule and its broader political meaning as a constitutional value.
27  See de Burca  (n 14) and de Burca (n 15).
28  M Petite, ‘Subsidiarity in Practice; A view from within the European Commission’ Record of 
the Subsidiarity Conference Sharing Power in Europe. Striking the Right Balance between EU 
and member state action, Thursday 17 November 2005, The Hague, The Netherlands 32.
29  It was acknowledged that ‘… subsidiarity was of an essentially political nature, imple-
mentation of which involved a considerable margin of discretion for the institutions (consid-
ering whether shared objectives could ‘better’ be achieved at European level or at another 
level), monitoring compliance … should be of an essentially political nature and take place 
before the entry into force of the act in question[.]’. Conclusions of Working Group I on the 
Principle of Subsidiarity, Brussels, 23 September 2002, CONV 286/02 WGI 1.  The Work-
ing Group has also confi rmed the need for a reinforced mechanism: ‘To take account of the 
primarily political nature of monitoring subsidiarity, it was important to link the possibil-
ity of appealing to the Court against violation of the principle of subsidiarity with the use 
by national parliaments of the early warning system proposed above. Recourse to judicial 
proceedings must be able to occur only in limited and probably exceptional cases, when the 
political phase has been exhausted without any satisfactory solution being found by the 
national parliament(s) involved.’ See the full text at <http://gandalf.aksis.uib.no/~brit/EX-
PORT-EU-Constitution/Export-Document-CONV/CONV-286-02-09-23-EN/index.html> 
accessed 30 March 2008. 
30  N Bernard, ‘The Future of European Economic Law in the Light of the Principle of Sub-
sidiarity’ (1996) 33 CML Rev 665.
31  See Peterson (n 8) 132.
32  R Barents, ‘Het subsidiariteitsbeginsel in het Hervormingsverdrag’ (2007) 11 Nether-
lands Tijdschrift voor Europees Recht 256-57. 
33  This view is upheld by Estella. See A Estella (n 10).
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the signifi cance of subsidiarity as legally provided in the Treaty of Maas-
tricht, which considerably increased the competences of the Union. The 
principle of subsidiarity was therefore perceived as a counterbalance - a 
tool to protect national competences and interests. On the contrary, ac-
cording to the second interpretation, subsidiarity functions as a ‘Janus 
face’34 or a ‘double-edged sword’,35 as Member States can adopt a stricter 
or looser stand based on their interests and the level at which they want 
them to be achieved. This Janus-faced aspect of subsidiarity is suggest-
ed by the fact that the Amsterdam Protocol refers to subsidiarity as a 
‘dynamic concept’ which shall respect ‘the institutional balance’. Seen 
as such, subsidiarity allows Member States to create more Europe in 
some areas and less Europe in others, according to their interests and re-
sources in managing particular policy aspects.36 According to this second 
interpretation, subsidiarity functions therefore as a platform to decide 
which is the regulatory level that best suits the Member States in achiev-
ing their interests and mitigates the exercise of shared competences. 
These stumbling blocks of subsidiarity created the view that ‘techni-
cally the principle is diffi cult to operationalize.’37 Its overall assessment 
highlights its limited practical signifi cance when it comes to operation-
alisation based on its legal framework and therefore its limited useful-
ness in demarcating the exercise of competences between the EU and 
the Member States.38 It also highlights the shaded areas where the EU 
34  See T Jeppesen, ‘Subsidiarity: A Janus Head?’  (1995) European Studies Discussion 
Paper No. 11/95, Odense University.
35  See J Golub, ‘Sovereignty and Subsidiarity in EU Environmental Policy’ (1996) 44 Politi-
cal Studies 686-703.
36  In this view, it can be said that the decisions adopted at the level of the Council, and 
thus at the level of the Member States, within the second and third pillars are so far the 
ones closer to this meaning attributed to subsidiarity. Such an example is the Council 
Framework Decision (EC) on the European arrest warrant and the surrender procedures 
between Member States [2002] OJ L 190/1. Recital 7 in the preamble to this framework 
decision provides that ‘Since the aim of replacing the system of multilateral extradition built 
upon the European Convention on Extradition of 13 December 1957 cannot be suffi ciently 
achieved by the Member States acting unilaterally and can therefore, by reason of its scale 
and effects, be better achieved at Union level, the Council may adopt measures in accor-
dance with the principle of subsidiarity as referred to in Article 2 of the Treaty on European 
Union and Article 5 of the Treaty establishing the European Community. In accordance 
with the principle of proportionality, as set out in the latter Article, this Framework Deci-
sion does not go beyond what is necessary in order to achieve that objective.’ This act has 
been challenged for its validity before the ECJ, one of the allegations being its breach of 
the principle of subsidiarity. In case C – 303/05 Advocatten voor de Wereld  [2007] ECR- 
I-3633, the ECJ delivered its judgment on this issue and found no breach of subsidiarity, 
thus maintaining the act and, therefore, the Member States’ will when adopting this far-
reaching decision.
37  P Syrpis, ‘In Defence of  Subsidiarity’ (2004) 24 OJLS 323-34.
38  In the words of Micklitz, subsidiarity was ‘a mere weapon of Member States to refute 
Community activities, dominating any […] positive constructive element, which would 
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decision-making process is left in terms of claims of power sharing and 
achievement of interests. 
2.1.3 Institutional practices 
The burden of complying with subsidiarity lies mainly with the Eu-
ropean Commission as it holds the central role in proposing legislation. 
The Amsterdam Protocol on the Application of the Principles of Subsidi-
arity and Proportionality requires a motivation of compliance with these 
principles for any proposed Community legislation.39 The Commission 
has therefore the duty to publish the explanatory memoranda of the leg-
islative acts in the Offi cial Journal. Yet, it has been observed that the 
motivation which the Commission gives in the explanatory memoranda is 
not up to expectations and full attention is not being paid to subsidiarity. 
In the words of Wyatt, this is ‘perfunctory attention’.40 At the moment of 
Maastricht, subsidiarity was seen as an opportunity to slow down the 
legislative function of the Commission.41 The Commission at that time 
reviewed its legislative proposals and withdrew the ones crossing the line 
of subsidiarity.42 Over time, it has also improved its consideration of sub-
sidiarity. Within the Better Regulation action, the Commission developed 
guidelines for the explanatory memoranda, which have to be included in 
its legislative proposals.  Since 2003, the Commission has been conduct-
ing impact assessments of envisaged legislative proposals, as new action 
to improve its policy making competence.43 In the framework of the 2007 
mean, that Member States might have to support the Community in the development of ad-
equate rules to achieve the objectives of the Community.’ See HM Micklitz, ‘The Maastricht 
Treaty, the Principle of Subsidiarity and the Theory of Integration’ [1993] Lakimies (Finnish 
Law Review) 531.
39  Article 4 of the Protocol provides: ‘For any proposed Community legislation, the reasons 
on which it is based shall be stated with a view to justifying its compliance with the prin-
ciples of subsidiarity and proportionality; the reasons for concluding that a Community 
objective can be better achieved by the Community must be substantiated by qualitative or, 
wherever possible, quantitative indicators.’
40  D Wyatt, ‘Subsidiarity - Is it too Vague to be Effective as a Legal Principle?’ in K Nicolaidis 
and S Weatherill (eds), Whose Europe? National Models and the Constitution of the European 
Union (OUP, European Studies at Oxford, 2003) 5.
41  See K Van Kersbergen and B Verbeek, ‘Subsidiarity as a Principle of Governance in the 
European Union’ (2004) 2 Comp Eur Politics 143-63.
42  This was, for example, the case with the directives on bathing and drinking water. Also, 
a directive on animal welfare in zoos was originally published in 1991 under OJ C249/14, 
and then withdrawn because of the subsidiarity principle, as contained in European Com-
munities C Bulletin 12/1992, 18. In 1999, however, the Directive suddenly appeared again 
as Council Directive (EC) 1999/22 relating to the keeping of wild animals in zoos [1999] 
OJ L94/24.
43  According to the Commission, ‘Impact assessment (IA) is a process aimed at structuring 
and supporting the development of policies. It identifi es and assesses the problem at stake 
and the objectives pursued. It identifi es the main options for achieving the objective and 
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evaluation report on the impact assessment system, it has been sug-
gested that ‘the scope of application of the IA [impact assessment] system 
should be adapted to cover proposals with the most signifi cant potential 
impacts or those that pose particular problems with a view to subsidi-
arity.’44  Nevertheless, the Commission has clearly stated that ‘impact as-
sessment is an aid to political decision, not a substitute for it. It informs 
decision-makers of the likely impacts of proposals, but it leaves it up to 
them to take the decisions.’45 Full protection of subsidiarity cannot there-
fore be expected from the Commission as this institution has taken the 
view that although it has application in law, subsidiarity is an ‘essentially 
political principle’.46 
The decision on subsidiarity is left to interinstitutional interaction in 
the political arena. In this context, the Council47 and the Parliament48 are 
also obliged to observe compliance with the principle of subsidiarity as an 
integral part of the overall examination of the Commission’s proposals. 
Although self-defi ned as the ‘guardian of the principle of subsidiarity’,49 
the Committee of the Regions has limited infl uence on the decision-mak-
ing process and in scrutinising the legislative proposals brought forward 
analyses their likely impacts in the economic, environmental and social fi elds. It outlines 
advantages and disadvantages of each option and examines possible synergies and trade-
offs.’ See Commission (EC), ‘Impact Assessment’ (Communication) COM (2002) 276, 5 June 
2002.
44  Commission (EC), ‘Better Regulation and enhanced Impact Assessment’, (Information 
note from the President to the Commission), SEC (2007) 926, 28 June 2007.
45  See Commission (EC) ‘Impact assessment guidelines’ SEC(2005) 791 15 June 2005 
<http://ec.europa.eu/governance/impact/docs/key_docs/sec_2005_0791_en.pdf> ac-
cessed 30 March 2008. 
46  Commission (EC), Communication on the principle of subsidiarity, Bull. EC 10, 1992, 
point 1. 1.4.  
47  The European Council of Edinburgh emphasised the role that the Council plays in as-
suring subsidiarity due to its decisional powers among the EU institutions. See European 
Council (EC), Conclusions of the Presidency, Annex 1, Overall approach to the application 
by the Council of the subsidiarity principle and Article 3b of the Treaty on European Union, 
Edinburgh 11 - 12 December 1992, 24.
48  Rule 34 of Parliament’s Rules of Procedure states that ‘[d]uring  the examination of a 
legislative proposal, Parliament shall pay particular attention to respect for fundamental 
rights and in particular that the legislative act is in conformity with the European Union 
Charter of Fundamental Rights, the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality and the 
rule of law.’ See European Parliament, Rules of Procedure, 16th edition, February 2008 < 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+RULES-EP+200
80218+TOC+DOC+XML+V0//EN> accessed 30 March 2008.
49  See the Committee of the Regions (EC) ‘Five questions, fi ve answers’ (Brochure) <http://
www.cor.europa.eu/pages/DetailTemplate.aspx?view=detail&id=e955fa3e-b44c-483c-
a05a-851aca72acd0 > accessed 30 March 2008. For an overview on the activity conducted 
as regards the implementation and monitoring of the principle of subsidiarity, see Commit-
tee of the Regions (EC), The Committee of the Regions and the implementation and monitoring 
of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality in the light of the Constitution for Europe 
(Offi ce for Offi cial Publications of the European Communities, Luxembourg 2006). 
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by the Commission due to the fact that it can only act in an advisory ca-
pacity.50 Nevertheless, its activity has added more input for highlighting 
the shortcomings in the application of the principle of subsidiarity.51 It is 
interesting to note that the Committee acknowledged the fundamentally 
political nature of subsidiarity, and the stance taken is that subsidiarity 
is a dynamic principle which can work both ways, either extending or 
limiting EU powers.52 
50 Article 263 EC provides that ‘A committee, hereinafter referred to as “the Committee of 
the Regions”, consisting of representatives of regional and local bodies who either hold a 
regional or local authority electoral mandate or are politically accountable to an elected as-
sembly, is hereby established with advisory status.’  Article 265 EC provides that ‘The Com-
mittee of the Regions shall be consulted by the Council or by the Commission where this 
Treaty so provides and in all other cases, in particular those which concern cross-border 
cooperation, in which one of these two institutions considers it appropriate.’
51  In 2005 the Committee of the Regions established a Subsidiarity Monitoring Network as 
a tool to exchange information between regional actors and proposals of the Commission 
which would impact on them. Within this framework, two tests were conducted in order 
to collect feedback from regional actors vis-à-vis four legislative proposals. The fi rst test 
ran from 31 October until 9 December 2005 and involved 21 partners which were asked to 
prepare a subsidiarity/proportionality analysis of the two EC legislative documents, ‘The-
matic strategy on air pollution’ (COM(2005) 446 fi nal) and ‘Proposal for a  directive of the 
European Parliament and of the Council on ambient air quality and cleaner air for Europe’ 
(COM(2005) 447 fi nal)1.The second test ran from 6 October until 17 November 2006 and 
involved 49 partners which had to prepare an analysis, on the basis of the provisions of the 
Subsidiarity Protocol annexed to the Treaty of Amsterdam, of two EC legislative documents: 
‘Proposal for a recommendation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the es-
tablishment of the European Qualifi cations Framework for lifelong learning’ (COM(2006) 
479 fi nal) and Communication from the Commission: ‘Effi ciency and equity in European 
education and training systems’(COM (2006) 481 fi nal). In general terms, the analysis 
showed broad compliance with the principle of subsidiarity and proportionality of the acts 
included in the fi rst test, while more criticism was given for the acts analysed within the 
second test. The suggestions of the tests referred, among other things, to the following: 
the need for better motivation by the Commission for compliance with the principle of sub-
sidiarity in its legislative proposals; better impact assessments; better specifi cation of the 
measures by means of which the Member States are requested to achieve certain objectives; 
and a strict application by the Commission of the Protocol on Subsidiarity and Proportion-
ality, especially in areas where there are supporting political powers (such as Article 149 
and 150 EC). For summaries with the conclusions of the two tests, see <http://www.cor.
europa.eu/document/activities/Executive_Summary_EN.pdf.> accessed 30 March 2008 
and <http://www.cor.europa.eu/document/activities/Report_2ndtest_CoR_Subsidiarity_
Network.pdf > accessed 30 March 2008.
52  In one of its internal documents, it is stated that: ‘Subsidiarity should be used as a dy-
namic tool that can create “more Europe” in some areas and “less Europe” in others, whilst 
always prioritising effi ciency and the democratic representation of our co-citizen’s interest.’ 
Furthermore, it is added: ‘It is important to remember that subsidiarity is a dynamic princi-
ple that works both ways. The aim of the subsidiarity principle is “better Europe”. It should 
not be misused as a means of increasing public distrust towards the EU and what it does, 
which brings real added value in many areas.’ See the position Committee of the Regions 
(EC), ‘The application and monitoring of the subsidiarity and proportionality principles: 
The Committee of the Regions’ political and operational role’ (Bureau document) R/CdR 
191/2006 item 8 fi n, 2 August 2006
<http://cor.ip.lu/migrated_data/R_CdR_191_2006_item_8_fi n.pdf> accessed 30 March 2008.
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It can be noticed from our analysis that subsidiarity functions as 
a principle of legal policy, deciding the level at which competences are 
exercised between the Union and the Member States. Such decisions are 
nevertheless politically guided. The principle of subsidiarity is therefore 
closely connected to the principle of interinstitutional balance, and the 
decisions on who should do what are interwoven in the EU law-making 
process in the institutional triangle: the Commission, the Council and 
the Parliament
2.1.4 Judicial review
So far we have discussed the application of the principle of subsidiarity 
at the ex ante law-making level. The ex post control regarding compliance 
of EU legislation with subsidiarity falls under the competence of the ECJ. 
On the introduction of subsidiarity as a principle of the Union, there were 
doubts as regards its judicial review by the Court. Toth argued that sub-
sidiarity was justiciable only up to a certain point due to the limited nature 
of the Court’s jurisdiction in cases involving judicial review of this aspect.53 
This view was countered once the principle started to enter the ambit of 
the ECJ’s case law. Hence, Dashwood observes that ‘the justiciability of 
the principle cannot any longer be doubted’.54 It can therefore be said that 
subsidiarity is justiciable ‘although not with mathematical certainty’.55 The 
ECJ confi rmed the justiciability of the principle of subsidiarity for the fi rst 
time in the case United Kingdom v. Council56 and more explicitly in later 
cases. The Court found that compliance with the principle of subsidiarity 
is one of the conditions covered by the requirement to state the reasons for 
Community acts, under Article 253 EC57, but it usually restricts itself to 
checking whether motivation has been provided within the preamble of the 
legal acts adopted.58 More substantive compliance with subsidiarity has 
been approached by the Court in only a few cases concerning the validity 
53  AG Toth, ‘Is Subsidiarity Justiciable?’ (1994) 19 EL Rev 268-81. See also V Harrison, 
‘Subsidiarity in Article 3b of the E.C. Treaty—Gobbledegook or Justiciable Prin-
ciple’ (1996) 45 ICLQ 431,435. 
54  A Dashwood, ‘The Relationship Between the Member States and the European Union/
European Community’ (2004) 41 CML Rev 368. 
55  V Harrison, ‘Subsidiarity in Article 3b of the EC Treaty: Gobbledegook or Justiciable 
Principle?’ (1996) 45 ICLQ 431-439.
56  C-84/94 United Kingdom v. Council [1996] ECR I-05755.
57  See, for example, ECJ judgments in Case C-84/94 United Kingdom v. Council [1996] ECR 
I-5755 and Case C-233/94 Germany v. Parliament and Council [1997] ECR I-2405.
58  In defi ning the limits of this procedural control of subsidiarity, the ECJ held that the 
absence of an explicit reference to the principle of subsidiarity in the legal acts does not 
constitute a breach of the obligation to motivate, as long as there is a clear justifi cation in 
the recitals that the aims of the measure can be best attained at Community level. Case C-
233/94 Germany v. European Parliament and Council [1997] ECR I-5755, para 26-28.
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of EU legislation.59 There has not yet been any judgment of annulment of 
an EU act due to breaches of the provisions on subsidiarity.60 Moreover, 
up to now subsidiarity has appeared only in a limited number of cases 
before the Court as a reason for asking for annulment or interpretation of 
EU legislation.61 The Court seems to be keeping a cautious approach due 
to the political sensitivity attached to the principle. Although it has been 
maintained that there is room for a more proactive approach, at least as re-
gards procedural scrutiny,62 we cannot ask or expect from the Court what 
it is not due to deliver, that is, political decisions.63
Wrapping up, it can be said that there is not too much room left for 
ex post judicial review of EU legal acts based on compliance with subsidi-
arity. In the case law of the ECJ, subsidiarity has been only ‘of little value 
as a standard of scrutiny’.64  Seen from a legal dimension, the overall pic-
ture of the judicial scrutiny of the principle of subsidiarity so far does not 
seem to shed light on how the exercise of powers is balanced between the 
Union and its Member States at the judicial law-making level. 
2.2 Subsidiarity in the Lisbon Treaty
2.2.1 Legal framework
In the Lisbon Treaty, subsidiarity is mentioned as an EU principle 
in Article 5 of the Treaty on the European Union, which approximately 
restates the provisions of the current Article 5 EC.65  The novelty brought 
59  See, for example, case C-377/98 Kingdom of the Netherlands v European Parliament and 
Council [2001] ECR I-7079, case C-491/01 R  v.  Secretary of State for Health, ex parte: Brit-
ish American Tobacco (Investments) Ltd and Imperial Tobacco Ltd [2002] ECR I-11453 and 
cases C-155/04 and C-154/04 Alliance for Natural Health and Others [2005 ] ECR I-6451. 
The Court did not fi nd a breach of subsidiarity since the measures proposed by the legal 
acts concerned the removal of obstacles to trade and distortion of competition in the inter-
nal market and were therefore easily justifi ed as discussed by Wyatt. See D Wyatt and A 
Dashwood, European Union Law (Sweet and Maxwell, London 2006) 102-03.
60  The most far-reaching decision adopted by the Court in scrutinising the balance of pow-
ers between the EU and the MS is the British American Tobacco case, discussing the appro-
priate legal basis for adopting legislation, respectively Articles 94 and 95 EC. See Case C-
491/01 R  v.  Secretary of State for Health, ex parte: British American Tobacco (Investments) 
Ltd and Imperial Tobacco Ltd [2002] ECR I-11453.
61  According to Estella, this is due to the fact that ‘the model subsidiarity case is that in 
which a Member State ... is outvoted [in the Council] and in turn brings an action of annul-
ment against that measure on the ground of subsidiarity.’ A Estella (n 10) 140.
62  See de Burca (n 15) 217-18.
63  In this line, Bermann favoured a rather procedural check of subsidiarity by the ECJ. See 
Bermann (n 7) 331-456.
64  C Ritzer, M Ruttloff and K Linhart, ‘How to Sharpen a Dull Sword – The Principle of 
Subsidiarity and its Control’ (2006) 7 German Law Journal 760.
65  According to Article 5 of the Treaty on the European Union, as amended by the Lisbon 
Treaty: ‘Under the principle of subsidiarity, in areas which do not fall within its exclusive 
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by Lisbon is the Protocol on the application of the principles of subsidiari-
ty and proportionality, which contains a legal framework for a reinforced 
control of subsidiarity.66 This protocol opens up access to the European 
law-making process for national parliaments, which are given the role of 
controlling the compliance of legislative proposals with the principle of 
subsidiarity.  Until now the ex ante protection of subsidiarity was left to 
the governments and their ability to defend the national regulatory com-
petences. The new framework provides for an ex ante role for national 
parliaments. Let us recall the main provisions of the Lisbon Treaty defi n-
ing the role of national parliaments to plead in this regard.67 As a fi rst 
step, the EU institutions have to transmit their draft acts to the national 
parliaments, which will be entitled to send reasoned opinions within an 
eight week early warning system on the legislative proposals received.68 
The EU institutions have to take account of the reasoned opinions issued 
by the national parliaments and, where non-compliance with the princi-
ple of subsidiarity represents at least one third of all the votes allocated 
to the national parliaments, the draft act must be reviewed.69 The institu-
tions can decide to maintain, amend or withdraw the act and they have to 
give reasons for the decision. In the case of draft proposals issued within 
the ordinary legislative procedure,70 if the proposed legislative act is con-
tested by a simple majority of the votes allocated to national parliaments, 
competence, the Union shall act only if and insofar as the objectives of the proposed action 
cannot be suffi ciently achieved by the Member States, either at central level or at regional 
and local level, but can rather, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be 
better achieved at Union level. The institutions of the Union shall apply the principle of sub-
sidiarity as laid down in the Protocol on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and 
proportionality. National Parliaments ensure compliance with the principle of subsidiarity 
in accordance with the procedure set out in that Protocol.’
66  The Dutch government was particularly the one insisting on the introduction of an en-
hanced control of subsidiarity through the involvement of national parliaments. For details 
on the positions taken by the Member States’ governments on the negotiation of the Lisbon 
Treaty, see V Miller, ‘EU Reform: An Old Treaty or a New Constitution’, (2007) Research 
Paper No. 07/64, House of Commons Library <http://www.parliament.uk/commons/lib/
research/rp2007/rp07-064.pdf > accessed 30 March 2008.
67  The relevant provisions on subsidiarity can be found in the text of the Lisbon Treaty and 
in three Protocols attached to it: Protocol on the role of national Parliaments in the Euro-
pean Union, Protocol on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality, 
Protocol on the exercise of shared competence. The text of the Lisbon Treaty is available 
on line at <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/JOHtml.do?uri=OJ:C:2007:306:SOM:EN:HTML > ac-
cessed 30 March 2008.
68  According to the Lisbon Treaty, the legislative proposals can originate from EU institu-
tions or a group of Member States. See the relevant provisions of the Protocol on the Ap-
plication of the Principle of Subsidiarity and Proportionality, Articles 3-6. 
69  Article 7, paragraph 2 of the Protocol: ‘This threshold shall be a quarter in the case of a 
draft legislative act submitted on the basis of Article 61 I of the Treaty on the Functioning 
of the European Union on the area of freedom, security and justice.’
70  This is co-decision.
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the Commission will have to review the respective act. The Commission 
can maintain, amend or withdraw the act. If maintained, the Commission 
will have to give a reasoned opinion for its decision.  In such a case, the 
Council and the Parliament will have to consider the reasoned opinion of 
the Commission and those of the national parliaments within a special 
procedure and decide on compatibility with the principle of subsidiarity. 
The legislative proposal considered under this procedure can be rejected 
for incompatibility with the principle of subsidiarity only with a majority 
of 55 per cent of the members of the Council and a majority of the votes 
cast in the European Parliament.  The ex post protection of subsidiarity 
is left to the competence of the European judiciary, which will be empow-
ered to hear cases alleging breaches of subsidiarity. Such actions can be 
introduced by the Committee of the Regions or by the Member States on 
behalf of their national parliaments. As a consequence, the effect of the 
new framework on subsidiarity will depend at last resort on the stance 
taken by the ECJ as regards the legal review of this principle.71
2.2.2 Interpretation and criticism
By strengthening the control on subsidiarity, the new mechanism 
provided by the Lisbon Treaty seems to intend an increased scrutiny of 
this principle. The weak ex post control of subsidiarity has been rein-
forced with an ex ante one.72 The essential added value of the new pro-
tocol is the association of the national parliaments in the process of law-
making at EU level. One author argued that it is indeed for the national 
parliaments to take an active role, as ‘…national Parliamentarians are 
the ones whose law-making powers are liable to be curtailed by a decision 
that a certain matter be regulated at the Union level, so they ought to 
be alert to possible infringements of the principle’.73 Nevertheless, there 
has been criticism in the literature as regards the real power of scrutiny 
which national parliaments will have. It has been argued that the infl u-
ence which national parliaments are expected to have is a limited one 
and ‘...we should be very careful not to expect national parliaments, or, 
more, accurately, parliamentary majorities, to turn suddenly and pub-
71  For Koopmans this is a reason to fear that the principle of subsidiarity will be depoliti-
cised and considered as a rather technical and legal aspect, instead of a matter of policy, 
which in his view would increase the gap between citizens and politicians, as the former 
want more visible political implication. See T Koopmans, ‘Subsidiarity, Politics and the Ju-
diciary’ (2005) 1 European Constitutional Law Review 112-16.
72  That is why some authors maintain that subsidiarity came back in force in the Constitu-
tional Treaty. See PA Feral, ‘Retour en force du principe de subsidiarité dans le traité con-
stitutionnel: de nouvelles responsabilités pour les parlements nationaux et pour le comité 
des régions’ (2004) 481 Rev Marche Com 496-99. 
73  Dashwood (n 57) 368.
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licly into assertive and powerful policy infl uencers in the EU affairs.’74 In 
this line, when analysing the role of national parliaments in European 
matters, Raunio concludes that most national parliaments are not suit-
ably equipped to scrutinise EU legislation.75 The framework for national 
parliaments’ involvement is also criticised by Weatherill as being only 
a limited power attributed to them.76 A true assessment of compliance 
with subsidiarity would imply giving technical expertise on substantive 
aspects, and the period prescribed in the Protocol does not allow enough 
time in this respect. The eight week timetable and the diffi culty of know-
ing the views of other national parliaments have been put forward within 
a test run in the framework of the Conference of Community and Euro-
pean Affairs Committees of Parliaments of the European Union (COSAC) 
as regards the early warning mechanism proposed in the Constitutional 
Treaty.77 Currently, the subsidiarity check included in the Lisbon Treaty 
is also being tested.78 
Moreover, broadly speaking, subsidiarity is not just an eight-week 
issue, but a continuous one, as it relates to the balance of powers be-
tween the Union and its Member States, and to the continuous disposal 
of interests. It may be said therefore that more effi cient control of the 
content of the legislative proposals could be done during the pre-formal 
negotiation process in the Council when views from the national parlia-
ments could be upheld by the government representatives; before having 
a draft proposal, national parliaments could infl uence their governments 
to negotiate and scrutinise in a certain way, as at a formal level it is more 
74  K Auel, ‘Democratic Accountability and National Parliaments: Redefi ning the Impact of 
Parliamnetary Scrutiny in EU Affairs’ (2007) 13 ELJ 487-504. In the same line, see also the 
analysis in S Weatherill, ‘Better Competence Monitoring’ (2005) 30 EL Rev 23-41.
75  Two improvements are suggested: national parliaments need more resources in order to 
deal with EU matters, and the scrutiny of subsidiarity should be extended to all specialised 
standing committees, not only to the ones explicitly in charge of EU affairs. These improve-
ments would have an important role in acquiring expertise in EU affairs. See T Raunio and 
M Wiberg, ‘Does Support Lead to Ignorance? National Parliaments and the Legitimacy of 
European Governance’ (2000) 35 Acta Politica 146-68.
76  S. Weatherill, ‘Using National Parliaments to Improve Scrutiny of the Limits of EU Action’ 
(2003) 28 EL Rev 909-12.
77  See Report on the results of COSAC’s pilot project on the 3rd Railway Package, testing 
the subsidiarity early warning mechanism <http://www.cosac.org/en/info/earlywarning/
pilotproject/pilot/> accessed 30 March 2008.
78  The test is conducted within COSAC for the Council Framework Decision amending 
Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA on combating terrorism COM(2007) 650 fi nal. More 
details about the test can be found at <http://www.cosac.eu/en/info/earlywarning/Test/
reldoc/pdf/> accessed 30 March 2008. More information about the role of COSAC in moni-
toring the principle of subsidiarity was presented by Lord J Grenfell, ‘Subsidiarity and CO-
SAC’ in Record of the Subsidiarity Conference Sharing Power in Europe. Striking the Right 
Balance Between EU and Member State Action, Thursday 17 November 2005, The Hague, 
The Netherlands 53-58.
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likely that the subsidiarity test will only be able to answer whether the 
procedural criteria  have been met. 
Several other aspects add to the view that the new role attributed 
to national parliaments will be a diffi cult one. As yet, there have been 
no fully, formally established structures at the level of national parlia-
ments responsible for the control of subsidiarity.79 As a result, one of the 
problems raised by the new framework relates to aspects of coordination. 
It has also been said that ‘[the] introduction of the ex-ante system could 
undermine efforts to enhance the effi ciency of EU decision-making, since 
national parliaments consultation would need to be co-ordinated and 
overseen.’80 This critique translates into the fear that the mechanism for 
controlling subsidiarity could hinder the European integration process. 
Furthermore, it has been observed that a confl ict might arise between 
the positions adopted by the national parliaments when checking sub-
sidiarity and the positions held by the corresponding governments in the 
Council.81  The political architecture and representation at national level 
will thus play an important role. 
As afore-exemplifi ed, although not yet in force, the new role attrib-
uted to national parliaments in the ex ante scrutiny of subsidiarity has 
already received a lot of criticism in the literature. Kiiver even concluded 
that ‘…putting false hopes in the national parliaments would mean to 
accept far less than what we are entitled to in terms of representative 
democracy in the European Union.’82  As drafted in the Lisbon Protocol, 
subsidiarity seems to have followed again the shield rationale, as intend-
ed at its introduction in the Maastricht Treaty. Nevertheless, it remains 
to be seen how national parliaments will make use in practice of their 
scrutiny powers.83
79  An overview of the foreseen models for the early warning mechanism in 25 national 
parliaments can be found at <http://www.cosac.eu/en/info/earlywarning/overview/ > ac-
cessed 30 March 2008.
80  P Beyer and others, ‘The Draft Constitution for Europe and the Environment’ (2004) 
July European Environmental Law Review 223. This relates to fears that the procedure 
will ‘politicise and indeed polemicise […] in ways which are counterproductive for the Eu-
ropean legislative process’. See F Amtenbrink, Continuation or Reorientation. What Future 
for European Integration? Erasmus Law Lectures 9 (Boom Juridische uitgevers, Den Hague 
2007) 34-35.
81  See for example discussions in A Follesdal, ‘Subsidiarity, Democracy, and Human Rights 
in the Constitutional Treaty of Europe’ (2006) 37 Journal of Social Philosophy (J Soc Phil) 
61-80; I Cooper, ‘The Watchdogs of Subsidiarity: National Parliaments and the Logic of 
Arguing in the EU’ (2006) 44 JCMS 281-304; and P Kiiver, The National Parliaments in 
the European Union: A critical View in the EU Constitution-Building (European Monographs, 
Maastricht 2005) 154-58.
82  P Kiiver above.
83  The stance taken by national parliaments might depend in part on the internal political 
architecture of every Member State.
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The Lisbon Treaty also reinforces the ex post control of the principle 
of subsidiarity. The Committee of the Regions is offered the right to in-
troduce actions for the annulment of ‘legislative acts for the adoption of 
which the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union provides that 
it be consulted’,84 if it considers that a certain act is breaching subsidi-
arity. Moreover, national parliaments will have an indirect right to intro-
duce actions on grounds of infringement of the principle of subsidiarity 
via their national governments.85
Although not containing an exhaustive list of criteria, it can be said 
that the Amsterdam protocol gave more guidance in applying subsidiarity 
than the Lisbon protocol, as some of these criteria have not been kept 
in the latter. This choice might be motivated by the fact that since Am-
sterdam the Commission has developed its impact assessment process, 
defi ning more specifi c criteria for applying the principle of subsidiarity. 
Another element of novelty in the Lisbon Treaty is that there is a clearer 
demarcation of competences.86 Nevertheless, problems might still arise 
due to their special content and phrasing in several policy areas.87 It can 
be observed that in the Lisbon Treaty subsidiarity continued to focus on 
questions of competences and not suffi ciently on questions of content 
and policy lines. One author even claimed that ‘[s]ubsidiarity remained 
the vague and elusive norm it has always been’.88 Yet, the importance of 
this new legal framework has been acknowledged, especially as regards 
its contribution towards reducing the democratic defi cit of the Union.89 
Moreover, the control mechanism for subsidiarity, although not having 
real power of scrutiny, might act towards raising the awareness of EU 
institutions that they should pay due attention to subsidiarity as it will 
be exposed to a broader assessment.  It can therefore be suggested that 
the new legal framework might help towards increasing the culture of 
subsidiarity at the level of EU institutions.90 
84  These areas are: economic and social cohesion, trans-European infrastructure networks, 
health, education, culture, employment policy, social policy, the environment, vocational 
training and transport. 
85  It remains to be seen whether national governments are willing to act on behalf of their 
national parliaments, especially in those cases in which the governments voted in favour of 
a particular legislative act within the decision-making process in the Council.
86  The Treaty provides a catalogue of competences, divided into exclusive, shared and sup-
porting, coordinating and supplementing competences.
87  See, for example, the relevant provisions in the Lisbon Treaty under the amendments 
introduced to the EC Treaty, Articles 2C, 2D, 18 B, 42.
88  See Kersbergen and Verbeek (n 41) 233.
89  See I Cooper, ‘Subsidiarity to the Rescue: Why the ‘Early Warning System’ Should be 
Salvaged from the Constitutional Treaty’ (2005) 40 Intereconomics 185-91.
90  It can be said that over the years, the Commission started to develop a certain culture 
for subsidiarity which is refl ected in instruments such as better regulation reports, impact 
assessments, etc, and that the Commission is more inclined to take account of subsidiarity 
if it wants its pieces of legislation to be adopted. 
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2.3 Intermediary conclusions 
The aspects analysed show that subsidiarity is a concept full of 
meaning. But, as stated by Bermann, subsidiarity ‘must not only mean 
something; it must matter’.91 To wrap up, it can be said that subsidiarity 
has proved so far to be only of limited value in understanding how pow-
ers are balanced between the EU and its Member States. Furthermore, in 
the Lisbon Treaty there are still shortcomings in the legal construction of 
subsidiarity. If seen as a shield against EU legislation, the legal framework 
of subsidiarity cannot perform a function of fully fl edged legal protection 
for national powers in the process of exercising the competences shared 
between the EU and its Member States.92 Likewise, if subsidiarity is seen 
as a double-edged sword, its legal framework does not provide us with 
full understanding of how the principle is operationalised in practice. The 
lack of clear criteria, in the current and future Lisbon legal framework of 
subsidiarity, for delimiting when the exercise of a certain competence lies 
with the Union and when with the Member States increases the opacity 
of the EU decision-making system.  One might argue that new adjust-
ments to the legal framework need to be made. These adjustments would 
depend on a further function desirable for subsidiarity: more shield pro-
tection or a dynamic double-edged sword interaction? Due to its mainly 
political character, it is hard to envisage a tight legal framework for sub-
sidiarity. Furthermore, given the long and hard political road which had 
to be climbed up to Lisbon, it is less probable that other treaty amend-
ments will soon see the light.93 
The analysis made, together with the criticism presented, does not 
intend to suggest that the existence of subsidiarity as a guiding principle 
of the Union is useless. Likewise, neither a denial nor an undervaluation 
of its legal and political signifi cance is implied.  Given the fact that there 
is no Kompetenz-Kompetenz for the Union, the non-inclusion of sub-
sidiarity among its guiding principles would mean leaving the exercise of 
competences somehow in a legal vacuum. Moreover, its role in diminish-
ing the democratic defi cit of the Union is also accepted. Subsidiarity ‘is a 
91  See Bermann, (n 7) 337.
92  Although it was introduced with high expectations, the reality check showed that it does 
not yield real power of watching over the integrationist development of the Union. In this 
view, Marquardt states that ‘just because subsidiarity provides a check on integration does 
not mean that it is protective of national prerogatives.’ See PD Marquardt, ‘Subsidiarity and 
Sovereignty in the European Union’  (1994) 18 Fordham Intl L Rev 639. The same approach 
is taken by Feral when stating that subsidiarity protects insuffi ciently the Member States 
against ‘l’expansionnisme’ of the EU. See PA Feral, ‘Le principe de subsidiarité après la sig-
nature du traité établissant une Constitution pour l’Europe,’ (2004) 38 Actualité juridique. 
Edition droit administratif  2085-93.
93  This does not exclude however the possibility to adopt secondary legislation.
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good objective to have’.94 Nevertheless, its practical effi ciency in control-
ling the balance of powers between the Union and the Member States 
is limited.95  The main question remaining is by whom and how is the 
exercise of shared competences decided in the daily interaction between 
the EU and its Member States?  Only by shedding more light at this level 
will there also be better understanding of the way in which the balance 
of powers between the two legal orders is maintained in every day work. 
Seen through the lens of its legal framework, subsidiarity does not prove 
to be a very useful principle in this regard; it tends to work as a principle 
for structuring the political discourse instead of functioning as an instru-
ment for operationalising the exercise of competences and the protection 
of national interests in the EU. What is then to be done? A change of 
perspective might provide greater understanding of how this balance is 
maintained in practice. 
3. Beyond subsidiarity. Perspectives for future legal research. 
3.1 Research approach
The review of subsidiarity in the previous section revealed that so far 
the demarcation of competences between the EU and the Member States 
has been mainly discussed with reference to the principles of attribu-
tion and subsidiarity. This has shaped a rather theoretical and abstract 
approach, which considers the demarcation of powers in the EU from a 
top-down perspective. But subsidiarity is not only an ideological concept 
in the EU; it is also an institutionalised instrument. This is why there is 
a need to look at the interinstitutional interaction during the law-making 
process, and not only at the fi nal outcome which is scrutinised in terms of 
subsidiarity. Attention is drawn here to investigating the process beyond 
the legal framework of subsidiarity which might shed more light on how 
the balance of powers between the two legal worlds is maintained in prac-
tice. In this view, this part of the article proposes a change of perspective 
by looking at the daily interaction between the two legal worlds and at 
how the frictions between them are resolved in practice. This translates 
into a more practical bottom-up approach.
  
94  L Tsoukalis, ‘The Politics and Economics of Subsidiarity’ in Record of the Subsidiarity 
Conference Sharing Power in Europe. Striking the Right Balance between EU and Member 
State Action, Thursday 17 November 2005, The Hague, The Netherlands.
95  It was said that subsidiarity operated ‘as an ambiguous norm, primarily offering a stand-
ard of behaviour for legitimate legislative action.’ See K Van Kersbergen and B Verbeek, ‘The 
Politics of International Norms: Subsidiarity and the Imperfect Competence Regime of the 
European Union’ (2007) 13 Eur J Intl Rel 224-25. 
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3.2 Hypothesis and aim
The criticism attributed to subsidiarity and the stated approach of 
future research suggest that another theory may have more explanatory 
potential for understanding the actual balance of power between the EU 
and its Member States and for defi ning the scope for legitimate protec-
tion of national interests. In this context, the following hypothesis is put 
forward: the competences between the EU and the Member States are 
demarcated in daily practice by negotiating and balancing national dis-
cretionary powers, rather than defi ned through the legal framework of 
subsidiarity.
One aim of future research would be to chart the use of discretion-
ary powers for protecting national interests in order to explain how com-
petences between the two realms, the EU and its Member States, are 
balanced in practice in the law-making process. A second aim would be 
to assess the normative reliance on and effi ciency of the discretionary 
powers left to the Member States in the law-making process as a tool for 
protecting national interests and reconciling the national and European 
legal orders. It is to this end that an approach beyond subsidiarity is pro-
posed as a follow-up of the analysis made in part 2 of this article. 
3.3 One level of analysis and three perspectives 
From a vertical perspective, research beyond subsidiarity would an-
alyse the use of discretionary powers at the level of the EU law-making 
framework.96 A broad understanding would be adopted for law-making, 
covering legislative action and judge-made law. Two practical research 
perspectives are proposed for this view. The fi rst one concerns an analy-
sis of the ex ante law-making process in the EU in order to assess the 
room for manoeuvre left to the Member States in protecting their national 
competences and interests. More specifi cally, it concerns the use of na-
tional discretionary powers in the negotiation process which leads to the 
adoption of EU legislation. The second practical perspective concerns an 
ex post protection of national interests as occurring at the level of the Eu-
ropean judiciary in the process of balancing national discretionary pow-
ers. A third perspective regarding the concepts of discretion, interests and 
unity would underlie and connect the two practical perspectives. Several 
general arguments, drawn forth by reviewing existing research or based 
on this author’s own assessment will be offered in order to motivate the 
choice of the three perspectives and to substantiate their operationalisa-
tion throughout the proposed research.  
96  At national level, discretion is at stake at national level when implementing EU legisla-
tion, more specifi cally EU directives, which leaves to the Member States the choice of the 
means to reach the desired goal. 
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3.3.1 Ex ante law-making
Since national interests are represented in the EU institutional ar-
chitecture at the level of the Council, this institution will therefore be our 
platform for analysis. In today’s EU institutional architecture, the Coun-
cil still holds the central position in the law-making process, although in 
the majority of areas it shares this power with the European Parliament 
within the co-decision procedure.97  The importance of this institution in 
the EU law-making process has been extensively acknowledged in legal 
and political sciences literature.98 Its role has been highlighted not only 
as regards formal aspects of the institutional mechanism for decision-
making, but also in connection to the process taking place beyond the 
formal rules. At the very initial stage of the European Communities, Haas 
pointed out the importance of people’s perceptions and attitudes for the 
cooperation process, underlining the difference between formal agree-
ment and the real power structure.99 He drew attention to the importance 
played by the Council within the integration process, observing that:
It is impossible to assess the role of the Council in European integra-
tion merely...on the basis of treaty texts. If the operational code habitu-
ally employed by the people who compose the Council can be demon-
strated to result in further integration, then plainly the general level of 
argumentation described [in treaty texts] is beside the point. 100
The focus of future research should be placed on a less visible in-
stitutional actor, but which holds a key position within the Council.  De-
signed as a body to support the work of the Council, as provided for in 
Article 207 EC, Coreper plays at present a de facto role in the EU law-
making process. It functions as an intermediary between the national 
governments and the EU institutions. The importance of this committee 
has not yet been suffi ciently acknowledged in the existing legal literature 
and there is a clear need for more and renewed study of its functioning 
due to the fundamental changes in the legal and political spectrum of the 
Council with the last accessions, and to the novelties introduced by the 
97  With the Lisbon Treaty, co-decision will become the ordinary procedure for decision-
making. 
98  As regards the principle of subsidiarity in connection to the Council, Hix is of the opinion 
that ‘…subsidiarity should relate to a check on the national governments far more than a 
check on the Commission’; ‘where the Member States have common interests and common 
preferences they are much happier to pass vague legislation and give each other a lot of dis-
cretion on how they implement the law.’ See S Hix, ‘Subsidiarity in Today’s EU: appropriate 
and legitimate’ in Record of the Subsidiarity Conference Sharing Power in Europe: Striking 
the Right Balance between EU and Member State Action, Thursday 17 November 2005, The 
Hague, The Netherlands, 43.
99  See E Haas, The Uniting of Europe (Stanford University Press, Stanford 1958).
100  E Haas, Beyond the Nation State (Stanford University Press, Stanford 1964).
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Treaty of Lisbon. Since its early establishment Coreper was designed as a 
body to support the work of the Council.101 Gradually, it developed more 
and more decision-making power. ECJ clarifi ed the role of Coreper in the 
decision-making process by interpreting the provisions of Article 207.102 
It stated that the de jure power rests with the Council.103 Nevertheless, 
the de facto role of Coreper in the decision-making process at Council 
level has been acknowledged in practice and in the literature.104 This has 
mainly been argued on the basis of the A-points practice, where deci-
sions are already taken at the level of Coreper and there is only a formal 
approval in the Council. At present, Coreper is a key player in the eve-
ryday decision-making process. This is due on one hand to the peculiar 
features of its own institutional setting and internal functioning, and on 
the other hand to the fact that this body operates within the bigger insti-
tutional architecture of the EU, at the crossroads of the main decision-
making actors: the European Commission, the European Parliament and 
the Council. So far, Coreper has been the object of study of several arti-
cles and book chapters, and even a limited number of books are entirely 
or partly dedicated to this EU body.105 Nevertheless, legal scholarship 
has not yet fully acknowledged the importance of this body. The most 
discussed aspects in the literature regard the following: the negotiation 
process undertaken at this level; the decision-making process in a rather 
broad context and the underlying issue of effi ciency; delegation and the 
role of bureaucrats. Less attention is given to aspects of political account-
ability, to specifi c decision-making procedures, such as co-decision, and 
to the effect of the political process on legal outcomes. Moreover, most of 
101  For a history of the fi rst decade of the functioning of Coreper, see NP Ludlow, ‘Mieux 
que six ambassadeurs. L’emergence du COREPER durant les premières années de la CEE’ 
in L Badel (ed), Les administrations nationales et la construction européenne: une approche 
historique (1919-1975) (Bruxelles, 2005).
102  Article 207 EC provides that: ‘A committee consisting of the Permanent Representa-
tives of the member States shall be responsible for preparing the work of the Council and 
for carrying out tasks assigned to it by the Council. The Committee may adopt procedural 
decisions in cases provided for in the Council’s Rules of Procedure’.
103  In case C 25/94, Commission of the European Communities v. Council of the European 
Union, 19 March 1996, the ECJ held that Coreper is only an auxiliary body of the Council, 
for which it carries out preparation and implementation work, and not an institution with 
decision-making powers on its own.  For a full explanation, see para 21-28 of the judge-
ment. For a comment on this case, see N Burrows, ‘COREPER, Competence and Conserva-
tion’ (1997) 22 (1) EL Rev 64-67.
104  This fi nding is mainly based on empirical research. See, for example, J Lewis, ‘Is the 
“Hard Bargaining” Image of the Council Misleading? The Committee of Permanent Rep-
resentatives and the Local Elections Directive’ (1998) 36 (4) Journal of Common Market 
Studies 481.
105  See the articles further mentioned in this paper and the following books: JW De Zwaan, 
‘The Permanent Representatives Committee: Its Role in European Union Decision-Making’ 
(1995) TMC Asser Instituut; V. Constantinesco, D. Simon (eds), Le COREPER dans tous ses 
etats, (Presses Universitaires de Strasbourg, Strasbourg, 2001). 
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the literature on Coreper takes a social and political sciences approach 
and less a legal one. In a recent rich empirical study, Larue concludes 
that additional research on both the roles and power of the bureaucrats 
working in Brussels is necessary.106 For Lewis, the community method 
is ‘partially produced and maintained through the institutional channel 
of Coreper’.107 This body is also the most relevant one for examining how 
national interests advocate in the EU decision-making process.108 
The present context offered by the changes introduced by the Lisbon 
Treaty, as well as in view of the past enlargement and future prospects, 
together with its specifi c institutional features, makes Coreper a relevant 
context to study the use of discretionary powers for the protection of 
national interests in the ex ante EU law-making process. For the pur-
pose of the proposed research, Coreper would therefore be employed as a 
barometer for assessing the use of national discretionary powers. Since 
it operates very much out of sight, its actual infl uence on the decision-
making process in the EU could therefore be made more visible in future 
research.
3.3.2 Ex post law-making
The second perspective proposed for an approach beyond subsidi-
arity targets the ECJ as a relevant context for performing the research. 
The role played by the Court in the EU’s constitutionalisation has already 
been widely acknowledged in the literature. The barometer for testing the 
use of discretionary powers would here be the principle of proportional-
ity, which represents a more effi cient criterion for assessing the balance 
between the powers of the EU and those of the Member States. On pro-
portionality, the Court has engaged into a much more solid case law. 
Since subsidiarity is dependent on proportionality as regards the kind of 
action envisaged, it has been suggested by Davies that it is a more suit-
able criterion for assessing the exercise of competences.109 The principle 
106  See T Larue, ‘Agents in Brussels: Delegation and democracy in the European Union’ 
(Doctoral Thesis, Umeå: Faculty of Social Sciences, Political Science 2006). This PhD the-
sis explores the delegation between bureaucrats in Brussels and governments in Member 
States’ capitals and concludes that additional research is necessary on both the roles and 
power of the bureaucrats working in Brussels: ‘Another future project ... would be to link 
the interest for national bureaucrats stationed in the member countries’ permanent repre-
sentations and expand the assessment of their roles within the EU system of policymaking 
in Brussels.’
107  J Lewis, ‘Is the “Hard Bargaining” Image of the Council Misleading? The Committee of 
Permanent Representatives and the Local Elections Directive’ (December 1998) 36 (4) Jour-
nal of Common Market Studies 486.
108  J Lewis, ‘National Interests: Coreper’ in J Peterson, M Shackleton (eds), The Institutions 
of the European Union (2nd edn Oxford University Press 2006) 282.
109  G Davies, ‘Subsidiarity: The Wrong Idea, in the Wrong Place, at the Wrong Time’ (2006) 
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of proportionality is an easier point of assessment as it observes that the 
burdens of a certain action will not be disproportionate to the objectives 
of the Community. 
At the level of ECJ law-making, discretion is left to the Member 
States when invoking the grounds of derogation provided by the Treaty, 
for example in the area of the internal market.110 An in-depth analysis 
of the discretion left by the Court to the Member States when assessing 
compliance with EU legislation vis-à-vis the application of the principle of 
proportionality would therefore build towards a better understanding of 
how the competences are balanced between the European and national 
realm; it would consequently show how the interests are being reconciled 
at this level. 
3.3.3 Conceptual interplay 
In light of the stated hypothesis, the dual aim and the level of analy-
sis, the ex ante and ex post perspectives of law-making in the EU would 
be underlined by a conceptual perspective on discretion, interests and 
unity. In the context of the proposed research approach, discretion would 
be understood as the residual competences that legal rules leave to agents 
in the framework of the EU law-making process. The concept of interests, 
in connection to state agents, would be defi ned as the balanced alterna-
tives between pure preferences, and the political and legal constraints 
present in the reality of the EU law-making process. Unity is understood 
here as the coherence and consistency of the EU law-making mechanism, 
which offers a unique framework for achieving national interests at a col-
lective level. Future specifi c research would employ these concepts as 
an analytical tool for answering the following question: how can Member 
States protect national interests through the use of discretionary powers 
in daily practice in the framework of EU law-making unity?
3.4 Methodology
The research approach proposed in this article would be mainstream 
legal research. Nevertheless, it would strike an interdisciplinary note when 
connected to philosophy within the conceptual perspective or political 
sciences in dealing with the functioning of Coreper, which would mainly 
be empirically driven. The novel perspective would be offered by drawing 
43 CML Rev 63-84.
110  These grounds refer to aspects of public morality, public policy, public security, public 
health, the protection of health and life of humans, animals or plants, the protection of 
national treasures possessing artistic, historic or archaeological value, or the protection of 
industrial and commercial property. See the relevant provisions in Articles 30, 46, 55 and 
58 of the EC Treaty.
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the analysis through the lens of discretion, a concept which would be 
transversally analysed in the context of EU law-making. 
4. Final concluding remarks 
It has been shown throughout the analysis made in this article that 
subsidiarity has been extensively analysed in the specifi c EU legal litera-
ture. Despite this academic attention, the reality check has showed its 
low effi ciency in achieving one of its envisaged roles: protecting national 
powers and interests. In this view, subsidiarity has been perceived as 
a ‘busted fl ush’,111 a ‘fi g leaf’112 or even as ‘the wrong idea, in the wrong 
place, at the wrong time’.113 Moreover, the legal framework of subsidi-
arity, developed through several EU Treaties, including the future Lisbon 
Treaty, fails to provide a clear understanding of how the principle is be-
ing considered in the EU decision-making process. These shortcomings 
are doubled by the cautious and marginal approach which the ECJ has 
taken so far in reviewing subsidiarity. It is in this context that this arti-
cle proposes an approach beyond subsidiarity for future research. This 
approach would conduct a bottom-up analysis to make sense of the way 
in which competences between the EU and its Member States are de-
marcated in daily interaction. It is proposed to make an analysis of the 
way national discretionary powers are used in the EU law-making proc-
ess to protect national interests. Two levels of analysis have been more 
specifi cally identifi ed: an ex ante one, when negotiating and adopting EU 
legislation, and an ex post one, when the ECJ balances the interaction 
between the EU and its Member States by employing the principle of 
proportionality. By assessing the use of discretionary powers as a tool for 
protecting national interests, future research might shed more light on 
how the two legal worlds are reconciled in the law-making process.
111  M Stewart, ‘Subsidiarity: A Busted Flash?’ in D O’Keeffe and PM Twomey (eds), Legal 
Issues of the Maastricht Treaty (Chancery/Wiley, Chichester/Colorado Springs 1994).
112  N Emiliou, ‘Subsidiarity: Panacea or Fig Leaf’ in Keeffe and Twomey (n 111) 65.
113  G Davies (n 109).
